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Abstract
The study develops the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique for the inde-
pendent double hurdle model. The proposed decomposition is done at the aggregate
level. Using the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2), the paper ap-
plies the proposed decomposition to explain the rural-urban di¤erence in parental
spending on own primary school children. The results show that at least 66% of the
expenditure di¤erential is explained by di¤erences in characteristics between rural
and urban households.
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1 Introduction
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, independently proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder
(1973), is a popular tool for identifying and quantifying di¤erences in economic outcomes
such as earnings, income, and schooling between two groups or periods. The economic
outcomes for two groups for example male-female, rural-urban or two time periods are
decomposed at their mean. This intergroup or interperiod mean level decomposition is
used for linear models. However, the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method
cannot be used to decompose nonlinear models such as the probit, logit, tobit, and the
independent double hurdle. Estimating a linear model when in fact the correct model is
a nonlinear one can lead to biased and inconsistent coe¢ cients, and this may in turn lead
to an inaccurate decomposition.
For nonlinear models; Fairlie (1999, 2005) has proposed the Blinder-Oaxaca decom-
position for logit and probit models, Bauer and Sinning (2008, 2010) have proposed an
extension of the same for tobit models. The aim of this paper is to propose an exten-
sion of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to the independent double hurdle model. The
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proposed decomposition is done at the aggregate level. The aggregated decomposition
isolates the gap in an economic outcome between two groups into a characteristic e¤ect,
which is a part of the gap explained by di¤erences in social-economic characteristics, and a
coe¢ cient e¤ect which is the part of the gap which is due to di¤erences in coe¢ cients. We
illustrate the proposed decomposition by using Malawian data to analyze the rural-urban
gap in parental spending on own primary school children. To the best of our knowledge
this paper is the rst to apply the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to examine di¤erences
in household expenditure.
2 Extending the Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition to
the Double Hurdle Model
One underlying feature of expenditure data is that it contains excess zeros, and the choice
of a statistical technique used to deal with the zeros is important, as an inappropriate
treatment of zeros can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates (Greene, 1981)1. The
tobit model (Tobin, 1958) has been widely used to model outcomes which have excess
zeros. The tobit model is derived from an individual optimization problem and views
zeros as corner solution outcomes. The major drawback of the tobit model is that it
assumes that the same stochastic process determines both the extensive and intensive
margins, that is, the decision whether or not to spend (participation decision) and how
much (expenditure decision), are treated as the same. This assumption is restrictive. A
model which corrects this limitation of the tobit model is the double hurdle model (DH
hereafter).
The DH model, originally formulated by Cragg (1971), assumes that households make
two decisions with regard to spending, each of which is determined by a di¤erent underly-
ing stochastic process (Blundell and Meghir, 1987). The double hurdle model estimated
separately for two groups of households, m = (U;R), with U and R denoting urban and
rural households respectively, is formally specied as follows (Jones, 1989);
The participation equation (the rst hurdle) is given as;
Dim = Z
0
im+ "im (1)
Dim =

1 if Dim > 0
0 otherwise
1Although the paper presents the decomposition in terms of the rural-urban expenditure di¤erence;
the proposed decomposition can also be used for identifying the causes of regional, cross-country, time
period, or other di¤erences in an outcome variable. Besides, the outcome variable need not necessarily
be expenditure; the proposed decomposition applies to all cases which require the estimation of the
independent double hurdle.
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The expenditure equation (the second hurdle) is given as follows;
Y im = X
0
im + im (2)
Y im = max(0; Y

im)
Observed expenditure(Yim);
Yim = DimY

im (3)
where; Dim is a latent variable describing the households decision to participate
(spend or not) on childrens education, Y im is a latent variable describing household ex-
penditure on childrens education, Z 0im is a vector of variables explaining the participation
decision, X 0im is a vector of variables explaining the expenditure decision. The parameter
vectors are m; m assumed to be linear. "im; im are independent random errors with the
following properties; "im  N(0; 1) and im  N(0; 2), and i denotes household. The
assumption of independence between "im and im is quite common when using the DH
(see for example Mauldin et al. (2001), Jensen and Yen (1996), Su and Yen (1996)). The
alternative would be to assume that the errors are dependent. However, Smith (2003)
shows that there is little statistical information to support the estimation of a DH with
dependent errors even when dependence exists.
To derive the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for the independent DH; consider the
DH as expressed in equation 3. We want to decompose the gap in the average value of
the dependent variable for rural and urban households, MDH= E(YU)  E(YR), by using
the following sample counterpart M^DH = YU   YR . The sample average expenditure
share for group m is given as Ym =
NmP
i=1
Y^im
Nm
; where Nm is the sample size for group m: The
"hat" denotes sample estimates. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the independent
DH similar to that for the Tobit by Bauer and Sinning (2008, 2010) is expressed in
terms of unconditional expectations of the dependent variable (Yim). The unconditional
expectation for the two groups is expressed as follows;
E(Yim) = Pr(Yim > 0)E(YimjYim > 0) (4)
Where the probability of expenditure is given by;
Pr(Yim > 0) =  (Z
0
imm) 

X 0imm
m

(5)
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and the conditional expectation of Yim is expressed as;
E(YimjYim > 0) = X 0imm +
m

X0imm
m



X0imm
m
 (6)
Three things need to be noted about equation 4. Firstly, the unconditional expec-
tation E(Yim) is not equal to E(Xim)0m as is the case in linear models on which the
standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is based2. As discussed earlier, imposing a linear
model on a dependent variable with excess zeros leads to biased and inconsistent coef-
cients, and therefore using coe¢ cients from the linear model would give a misleading
decomposition as well. Secondly, the unconditional expectation is not equal to that of
Tobit as it has another censoring mechanism,  (Z 0imm) which represents participation;
this means that we cannot use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for Tobit models as
developed by Bauer and Sinning (2008, 2010). Finally, equation 4 shows that the uncon-
ditional expectation has the standard error of the error term of the expenditure equation,
m. This may a¤ect the magnitude of the decomposition, and therefore has to be in-
cluded in the decomposition. As a result, there are several possible decompositions of the
mean di¤erence MDH , depending on which m is used in the counterfactual part of the
decomposition.
We therefore derive two possible decompositions for the independent DH3:
M DHR1 =
h
EU;U;U (YiU)  EU;U;R (YiR)
i
(7)
+
h
EU;U;R (YiR)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
and
M DHU1 =
h
EU;U;U (YiU)  EU;U;U (YiR)
i
(8)
+
h
EU;U;U (YiR)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
Where Em;m;m (Yim) denotes the unconditional expectation of Yim evaluated at the
parameter vectors m; m and the error standard error m. The di¤erence between the
2Assuming a linear model Yim = X 0i+i for illustration; the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
is based on the property of linear models with an intercept that the mean of a dependent variable is equal
to the mean of the regressors evaluated at their respective estimated coe¢ cients i.e. Yim = Xim^m: Hence,
the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is given as; YU  YR =

XU ^U   XR^R

=
 
XU   XR

^U+
^U   ^R

XR:
Where the "overbars" denote sample means and the "hats" denote sample estimates.
3These two possibilities are similar to that of Bauer and Sinning (2005) for the Tobit.
4
two decompositions is that equation 7 treats the standard error as part of the variables
while equation 8 treats it as part of the coe¢ cients.
The above decompositions use the urban coe¢ cients in the counterfactual; this implies
that if there was no gap in average expenditure share, the expenditure prole of the urban
would prevail. We can alternatively use the rural coe¢ cients; this implies that if there
was no gap in average expenditure, the expenditure structure of the rural areas would
exist. When the rural coe¢ cients are used the two possibilities are written as4:
M DHU2 =
h
ER;R;U (YiU)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
(9)
+
h
EU;U;U (YiR)  ER;R;U (YiR)
i
and
M DHR2 =
h
ER;R;R (YiU)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
(10)
+
h
EU;U;U (YiR)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
The rst term in the decompositions (equations 7-10) captures part of the average
expenditure share gap between the urban and rural households attributable to di¤erences
in covariates. This is the characteristic e¤ect. This basically is the part of the gap in
average expenditure share between the two groups of households assuming that both types
had the same coe¢ cients (behavior) but di¤erent endowments. Thus, this is a part of the
gap explained by di¤erences in characteristics. The last term in equations 7-10, measures
the di¤erence in average expenditure between the two groups which is due to di¤erences
in coe¢ cients. This is the coe¢ cient e¤ect. It is part of the gap which is unexplained by
the di¤erences in characteristics. Essentially, it is part of the gap assuming that urban
and rural households had the same characteristics but di¤erent coe¢ cients. We interpret
the coe¢ cient e¤ect as part of the gap attributable to behavioural di¤erences5. So for
example, assuming that rural and urban households have the same income levels, this
income may be a more important factor (implying a bigger coe¢ cient) to rural households
as compared to urban ones in their spending decisions.
In order to conduct the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as given in equations 7 to 10,
the following sample equivalent of the unconditional expectation (equation 4) is employed;
4This provides a robustness check of our results to choice of reference group. When decompositions
give di¤erent conclusions depending on the reference group used, an index number problem is said to
obtain. Various attempts have been made in the literature to resolve the index number problem for linear
models (e.g. Reimers 1983; Cotton 1988; Neumark 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom 1994).
5The coe¢ cient e¤ect in the labour economics literature is interpreted as a measure of discrimination.
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T

^m; ^m; Zim; Xim; ^m

= N 1m
NmX
i=1
8>><>>:
 (Z 0im^m) 

X0im^m
^m


 
X 0im^m +
m

X0im^m
m



X0
im
^m
^m

! 9>>=>>; (11)
Where ^m; ^m, and ^m denote sample estimates. With this sample counterpart of
the unconditional expectation, equation 7 is estimated by;
M^ DHR1 =
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^U ; ^U ; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
(12)
+
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiR; XiR; ^R

  T

^R; ^R; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
Equation 8 is estimated by;
M^ DHU1 =
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^U ; ^U ; ZiR; XiR; ^U
i
(13)
+
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiR; XiR; ^U

  T

^R; ^R; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
Equation 9 is estimated by;
M^ DHU2 =
h
T

^R; ^R; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^R; ^R; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
(14)
+
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^R; ^R; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U
i
Finally, equation 10 is estimated by;
M^ DHR2 =
h
T

^R; ^R; ZiU ; XiU ; ^R

  T

^R; ^R; ZiR; XiR; ^R
i
(15)
+
h
T

^U ; ^U ; ZiU ; XiU ; ^U

  T

^R; ^R; ZiU ; XiU ; ^R
i
If there is only one censoring mechanism, that is  (Z 0im^m) = 1, decompositions 7 to
10 reduce to that of a Tobit with censoring from below at zero, as proposed by Bauer and
Sinning (2008, 2010) for Tobit models. If expenditure is uncensored at zero, decomposition
7 and 8 are equal, and reduce to the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with urban
coe¢ cients used in the counterfactual. Similarly, decompositions 9 and 10 are equal and
reduce to the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with rural coe¢ cients used in the
counterfactual.
3 Empirical Application
The proposed decomposition is used to analyze the rural-urban gap in parental spending
on education of own primary school going children in Malawi. Specically, we want
to answer the following question, is the rural-urban spending di¤erence largely due to
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di¤erences in characteristics or due to di¤erences in behaviour? The data used in the study
come from the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2). This is a nationally
representative sample survey designed to provide information on the various aspects of
household welfare in Malawi. The survey was conducted by the National Statistical
O¢ ce from March 2004-April 2005. The survey collects information from a nationally
representative sample of 11,280 households. The survey collects annualized household
education information which includes household expenditure on primary, secondary, and
tertiary education, for household members aged 5 and above. In this illustration, we use
husband-wife and single-parent families with at least one child in primary school.
The dependent variable is the share of total annual household expenditure on the
education of primary school children in total annual consumption expenditure. In order
to account for price variability across areas and time, both expenditure items are deated
by using the Malawi National Statistical O¢ ces spatial and temporal deator with base
national, and February/March 2004. The expenditure items include; fees (tuition and
boarding), books and other materials, school uniform, contributions to school building
and maintenance, parental association fees, and other school related expenses. We in-
clude the following independent variables; age of the youngest primary school going child
in the household, the square of age of the youngest child to measure possible nonlinear-
ities, household permanent income as proxied by the log of total household per capita
expenditure, proportion of children who go to government schools in a household, num-
ber of children in a household, employment status of parents, educational level of parents,
parental age, the square of ages for both parents, distance to the nearest primary school
to measure quality of access of primary schools.
In order to capture the possibility of gender bias in spending, we construct a variable
dened as;
10X
i=1
Hg
H
, where Hg is the number of household members in age-gender group g
and H is the household size. We distinguish ten age and gender categories; ages 0-6, 7-15,
16-19, 20-55, and over 55 for each gender. Since we are using aggregate household educa-
tion expenditure data, this variable can give an indirect test of gender bias in spending. In
particular, to check for evidence of di¤erences in spending between primary school going
boys and girls we are concerned with the coe¢ cients of the age-gender variable for the
ages 7-15 for both sexes. If the coe¢ cients are signicant and di¤erent that is evidence
of preference for a particular sex in spending6. We control for regional xed e¤ects by
including a three class regional dummy for the north, centre, and south.
The log of per capita expenditure is potentially endogenous, through two possible
channels. Firstly, expenditure and spending on education can be jointly determined
through labour supply decisions in the sense that a decision to send children to school
6Testing for equality of coe¢ cients in both participation and expenditure equations for all groups of
household is done by using a Wald test. This approach to testing for gender bias was rst proposed by
Deaton (1989).
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may be jointly determined with a decision to send the children to work to supplement
household income. The second channel for endogeneity would be that parents with a good
taste for the education of their children may work harder so they are able to pay for their
schooling (Kingdon, 2005). We test for endogeneity using the Rivers and Vuong (1988)
procedure for the participation equation, and the Smith and Blundell (1986) procedure
for the expenditure equation. Land and its square are our instrumental variables. We nd
that the log of per capita expenditure is endogenous in the expenditure equation only for
rural households. To ensure comparability in terms of number of variables, we included
residuals from the reduced form regression for urban households in the urban expenditure
equation as well. The reduced form regressions of log of per capita expenditure for both
areas, show that the instrumental variables land and its square perform reasonably well
as they are signicantly correlated with the log of per capita expenditure7.
Before discussing results of the proposed decomposition, we briey comment on the
DH results for the two areas. For comparison, we also show results of the tobit model
(Table 3). Results in Table 1 show that some variables are signicant for one group
but insignicant for another; an indication of the rural-urban di¤erences. The age of
the youngest child is signicant and negative only in the participation equation for rural
households. This suggests that parents in rural areas are less likely to spend on the edu-
cation of children as they get older. The level of income as proxied by the log of per capita
expenditure signicantly increases the likelihood of spending on education and how much
is spent for both rural and urban households. The results therefore suggest that income
matters at both the extensive and intensive margins for the two groups of households.
For rural households, having a higher proportion of children going to government schools
signicantly increases the probability of spending on them but lowers the share of edu-
cation expenditure. For urban households having more government scholars lowers the
chance of spending on primary education but it has no impact on the share of education
expenditure in total expenditure.
We nd that the number of children inuences positively and signicantly the share
of education expenditure for rural households, but does not signicantly a¤ect the like-
lihood of spending on education8. For urban households having more children increases
the likelihood that a household will spend on their education but does not a¤ect the
share of expenditure. In terms of parental employment, the results show that for rural
and urban households a fathers and a mothers employment signicantly increases the
share of expenditure on education as well as the chance that they will spend on children.
7The reduced form regression results are not reported but are available from the author on request.
8It is worth recognizing that the number of children is potentially endogenous, if there is a quantity-
quality trade o¤ where parents prefer fewer children with a good education. Besides, if there is son
preference which a¤ects expenditure on childrens education, this may also a¤ect family size. Since we
have no valid instruments; we addressed the simultaneity problem arising from the quantity-quality trade
by re-estimating the DH models for all groups without number of children; our results largely remained
unchanged thus giving us condence that our results may not be biased due to simultaneity.
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With respect to education, we nd that the education of both the mother and the father
positively and signicantly a¤ects the decision whether or not to spend as well as how
much to spend on the primary education of their children in both rural and urban areas.
The quality of access of primary schools as proxied by distance to the nearest primary
school has a negative impact on the participation and the expenditure decisions of both
rural and urban households9.
In terms of the age-gender demographics, the results suggest that having more pri-
mary school going boys (i.e. proportion of males aged 7-15) and girls (i.e. proportion of
females aged 7-15) signicantly and positively impacts on the participation and the ex-
penditure decision levels of rural households. The same is true for urban households. We
investigate further to check evidence of gender bias against girls by conducting Wald tests
of the equality of the coe¢ cients for proportion of males and females aged 7-15 in the two
areas. Results of the tests are shown at the bottom of Table 1. The test results indicate
that for rural households there is gender bias against girls at both the participation and
expenditure decision levels. For urban households, the Wald test results indicate that
there are no statistically signicant gender di¤erences at both the intensive and extensive
margins. Thus, the Wald tests show evidence of gender bias in favour of boys in rural
areas only. Interestingly, we observe that when the tobit model is used (see Table 3),
there is no evidence of gender bias in both areas. We present the results and discussion
of the decompositions in the next section.
4 Results of the Decomposition
Results of the proposed decomposition are presented in Table 2. For comparison, we also
show in Table 4 results of the decomposition for the tobit model. The results indicate that
the DH model compared to the tobit model has a lower approximation error, implying
that it predicts spending more accurately. The gap in the predicted average share of
primary education expenditure between rural and urban households is largely due to
di¤erences in characteristics. For example, looking at the expenditure di¤erential when
urban coe¢ cients are used in the counterfactual, and we also use the urban variance in the
counterfactual, 66% of the gap is due to di¤erences in characteristics of the households,
and 34% of the gap is explained by di¤erences in estimated coe¢ cients, hence due to
9Distance to the nearest primary school can be endogenous, for example some communities may have
a leadership which values education and is more vocal and progressive. This may a¤ect both household
schooling decisions as well as placement of schools. Another possible source of endogeneity is that
parents with high aspirations for their children may "vote with their feet" by moving to areas where
schools are nearer. And this unobserved high aspiration by parents may a¤ect both distance to schooling
and schooling decisions. We dont have valid instruments for distance to nearest primary school, so
we re-estimated the models without distance to nearest primary school and our results were marginally
di¤erent from those with distance to nearest primary school thus giving us some level of assurance about
the reliability of our results.
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behavioural di¤erences. The two aggregate e¤ects are statistically signicant at 1%. This
result means that if rural and urban household characteristics were to be equalized, 66%
of the spending gap would vanish. On the other hand, if the behaviour of rural and urban
households was equalized, 34% of the spending gap would disappear. Similarly, when
the urban coe¢ cients and the rural variance are used in the counterfactual, the results
indicate that the characteristic e¤ect is 67.6% and that 32.4% of the expenditure gap
is attributable to di¤erences in coe¢ cients. Both e¤ects are statistically signicant. In
this case 67.6% (32.4%) of the spending gap would vanish if household characteristics
(behaviour) were equalized.
The picture that is emerging from the DH decomposition results is that the gap in
spending between rural and urban households largely arises from di¤erences in their char-
acteristics. The same conclusion is arrived at when we ignore the participation equation
and use the tobit model (see Table 4). It is however worth noting that decomposition
results for the tobit consistently give a higher (lower) measure of the characteristic e¤ect
(coe¢ cient e¤ect); which suggests that when we when do not account for the fact that
spending is made in two stages, we overestimate (underestimate) the characteristic e¤ect
(coe¢ cient e¤ect). In a nutshell, the DH and tobit results suggest that the rural-urban
gap in expenditure is mainly due to di¤erences in characteristics; and this nding is robust
to choice of both variance and coe¢ cients used in the counterfactual as well as ignoring
the participation equation as a censoring mechanism. The robustness of the decompo-
sition results to choice of counterfactual implies that we do not have an index number
problem.
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper has proposed an extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique to
the independent DH. Using the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2), the
paper has applied the proposed decomposition to explain the rural-urban di¤erence in
parental spending on own primary school children.
Results from the decomposition show that at least 66% of the expenditure di¤erential
arises from di¤erences in characteristics, and about 34% is due to behavioural di¤erences
(estimated coe¢ cients) between rural and urban households. This conclusion is robust to
choice of coe¢ cients and variance used in the counterfactual. It is also robust to assuming
that the zeros in expenditure are entirely a result of a corner solution.
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Table 1: Results of the independent DH by area of residence
Variable
Rural Urban
participation level participation level
Household characteristics
last child’s age -0.05488*** -0.01060 0.30450 0.00072
(0.01614) (0.00883) (0.23719) (0.00365)
last child’s age2 0.00104*** 0.00022 -0.00767 -0.00009
(0.00038) (0.00021) (0.00710) (0.00009)
consumption expenditure 0.23207*** 0.05227*** 0.56821*** 0.03576***
(0.05461) (0.00355) (0.01981) (0.01283)
government scholars 0.76890*** -0.11241** -2.86960** 0.02045
(0.10820) (0.04691) (1.34249) (0.01268)
children 0.03128 0.04425*** 1.63650** -0.00016
(0.04129) (0.01411) (0.64050) (0.00804)
children2 -0.00132 -0.00132** -0.14069** 0.00046
(0.00398) (0.00056) (0.07013) (0.00084)
Parental characteristics
father works 0.00650*** 0.00756*** 0.04989*** 0.02324***
(0.00138) (0.00155) (0.00224) (0.00296)
mother works 0.20134*** 0.02023*** 0.64032*** 0.02352***
(0.05835) (0.00219) (0.07506) (0.00132)
father’s education 0.00677*** 0.01142*** 0.02940*** 0.00121***
(0.00170) (0.00259) (0.00354) (0.00019)
mother’s education 0.00683*** 0.00865*** 0.03234*** 0.00231***
(0.00101) (0.00148) (0.00609) (0.00026)
father’s age 0.03908 0.01789 0.90438** -0.01001
(0.03091) (0.01648) (0.37120) (0.00628)
father’s age2 -0.00019 -0.00018 -0.00825** 0.00010
(0.00027) (0.00015) (0.00341) (0.00006)
mother’s age 0.04274 0.05428*** -0.51033** -0.01090
(0.03055) (0.01915) (0.21431) (0.01311)
mother’s age2 -0.00045 -0.00048*** 0.00328* 0.00015
(0.00028) (0.00018) (0.00181) (0.00014)
School characteristics
distance primary -0.00699*** -0.00908*** -0.02440***
(0.00024) (0.00084) (0.00158)
Age-gender composition of household
males aged 0-6 1.11652** -0.27137 -8.03960 0.20918*
(0.55346) (0.21291) (5.46235) (0.11936)
males aged 7-15 1.94601*** 0.23238*** 6.16139*** 0.18465***
(0.54091) (0.00950) (0.09781) (0.00321)
males aged 16-19 1.05852* 0.30828 -11.41691* 0.26668*
(0.57515) (0.22514) (6.57410) (0.14466)
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males aged 16-19 1.05852* 0.30828 -11.41691* 0.26668*
(0.57515) (0.22514) (6.57410) (0.14466)
males aged 20-55 0.43034 0.14724 -12.28649** 0.17875*
(0.50640) (0.18605) (5.65072) (0.10662)
females aged 0-6 0.87586 -0.58748** 7.37600 0.26562**
(0.54953) (0.25236) (5.68817) (0.12612)
females aged 7-15 1.82512*** 0.25020*** 7.70956*** 0.29012**
(0.23620) (0.00930) (0.40535) (0.12162)
females aged 16-19 0.33254 0.36888* -8.92036 0.31863***
(0.59034) (0.22344) (5.63699) (0.12218)
females aged 20-55 0.63089 0.30406 -3.77753 0.12265
(0.59596) (0.23380) (4.96818) (0.10029)
females above 55 1.47903** 0.51368* -4.29883 0.41458**
(0.71350) (0.28441) (6.11054) (0.18104)
Region
north 0.17206*** 0.13929* -1.56052* 0.04564
(0.06414) (0.07396) (0.87341) (0.03108)
centre 0.70344*** 0.01791 -0.73286 -0.02001*
(0.05767) (0.02882) (0.61972) (0.01063)
Controls for endogeniety
residualcons -0.19670** (0.02123)
(0.08155) (0.01426)
constant -5.71966*** -1.95478* (9.54081) (0.12453)
(1.40696) (1.16150) (12.48037) (0.33370)
sigma 0.01358*** 0.01182***
(0.00258) (0.00160)
Log-likelihood -6167.27 -2075.03
P-values of equality of coefficients of males aged 7-15 and females aged 7-15:
0.007 0.002 0.52 0.36
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors.  Residualcons is the residual from the reduced form of log per capita consumption expenditure.
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Table 2: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the independent DH
Using the urban variance
Actual expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted expenditure share gap 0.0097*** 0.0097***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Characteristic effect 0.0064*** 0.0066***
(0.0011) (0.0002)
% of raw gap 66% 68.43%
Coefficient effect 0.0032*** 0.0031***
(0.00041) (0.00063)
% of raw gap 34% 31.57%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0003 0.0003
Using the rural variance
Actual expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted expenditure share gap 0.0097*** 0.0097***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Characteristic effect 0.006*** 0.0069***
(0.00057) (0.0015)
% of raw gap 0.676 0.7113
Coefficient effect 0.0031*** 0.0028***
(0.0002) (0.00082)
% of raw gap 32.40% 28.87%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0003 0.0003
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in
parentheses are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. Approximation error is the difference
between the actual expenditure share gap and the predicted expenditure share gap.
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Table 3: Results of the Tobit by area of residence
Variable Rural Urban
Household characteristics
last child’s age -0.00044*** 0.00191
(0.00016) (0.00176)
last child’s age2 0.00001** -0.00008
(0.00000) (0.00005)
consumption expenditure 0.00171*** 0.01259**
(0.00018) (0.00611)
government scholars 0.00337*** 0.01023
(0.00072) (0.00670)
children -0.00009 0.00293
(0.00025) (0.00351)
children2 0.00006** 0.00009
(0.00002) (0.00040)
Parental characteristics
father works 0.00134*** 0.0164***
(0.00032) (0.00368)
mother works 0.02277** 0.01213***
(0.00034) (0.00129)
father’s education 0.00151*** 0.01206***
(0.00004) (0.00037)
mother’s education 0.00431*** 0.01074***
(0.00007) (0.00049)
father’s age 0.00059* -0.00024
(0.00030) (0.00216)
father’s age2 -0.00000* 0.00000
0.00000 (0.00002)
mother’s age 0.00077*** -0.00259*
(0.00023) (0.00144)
mother’s age2 -0.00001*** 0.00002*
(0.00000) (0.00001)
School characteristics
distance primary -0.00042* -0.01039***
(0.00022) (0.00295)
Age-gender composition of household
males aged 0-6 0.00150 -0.02059
(0.00346) (0.03275)
males aged 7-15 0.00871 0.01916
(0.33700) (0.23000)
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males aged 20-55 0.00291 -0.04197
(0.00316) (0.02973)
females aged 0-6 -0.00124 -0.00743
(0.00345) (0.03255)
females aged 7-15 0.00867 0.07097
(0.33400) (0.97700)
females aged 16-19 0.00640* -0.00056
(0.00374) (0.02995)
females aged 20-55 0.00419 -0.00840
(0.00378) (0.03112)
females above 55 0.00874* 0.05879
(0.00448) (0.04469)
Region
north 0.00097 0.01347
(0.00125) (0.01054)
centre 0.00266*** -0.00272
(0.00050) (0.00388)
residualcons -0.00246* -0.00538
(0.00132) (0.00683)
constant -0.04727** -0.05142
(0.02112) (0.11718)
sigma 0.00813*** 0.01340***
(0.00011) (0.00102)
Log-likelihood (6211.47) (2107.53)
P-values of equality of coefficients of males aged 7-15 and females aged 7-15:
0.2315 0.5768
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors. Residualcons is the residual from the reduced form of log per capita consumption expenditure.
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Table 4: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the tobit
Using the urban variance
Actual expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted expenditure share gap 0.0059*** 0.0059***
(0.001) (0.001)
Characteristic effect 0.0044*** 0.0046***
(0.0004) (0.0001)
% of raw gap 74.60% 77.97%
Coefficient effect 0.0015*** 0.0013***
(0.00021) (0.00041)
% of raw gap 25.40% 22.03%
Counterfactual coefficients Urban rural
Approximation error 0.0041 0.0041
Using the rural variance
Actual expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted expenditure share gap 0.0059*** 0.0059***
(0.001) (0.001)
Characteristic effect 0.0048*** 0.0045***
(0.00021) (0.00037)
% of raw gap 81.56% 76.27%
Coefficient effect 0.0011*** 0.0014***
(0.00026) (0.00022)
% of raw gap 18.64% 23.73%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0041 0.0041
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in
parentheses are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. Approximation error is the difference
between the actual expenditure share gap and the predicted expenditure share gap.
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